图书简介
The exposure of two senior republicans as informers for British intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had ’lost’ the intelligence war and was pressurised into peace. In this first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain’s intelligence activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to special-forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence operate against paramilitaries? Is it effective? When should governments ’talk to terrorists’? And does regional variation explain the outcome of intelligence conflicts? This is a major contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace emerged in Northern Ireland.
Introduction; Part I. The Intelligence War, August 1969 to July 1972: 1. British political, military and intelligence strategy towards the IRA, August 1969 to July 1972; 2. The Intelligence War part I, August 1969 to July 1972; 3. The IRA’s ceasefire, 26 June to 9 July 1972; Part II. On the Verge of Defeat?: the Intelligence War Part II, July 1972 to December 1975: 4. British political, military and intelligence strategy towards the IRA, July 1972 to December 1975; 5. The Intelligence War part II: July 1972 to December 1975; 6. ’Everything is compromisable after the British Declaration of Intent’: the IRA returns to ceasefire, December 1974 and December 1975; Part III. The Struggle to Contain the IRA, January 1976 to April 1998: 7. British political, military and intelligence strategy towards the IRA, 1976 to 1998; 8. The Intelligence War part III: Belfast and Derry city, January 1976 to August 1994; 9. The Intelligence War part III: the IRA in rural areas, England and the IRA leadership, January 1976 to August 1994; 10. ’It’s the primacy of politics that’s important’: alternative reasons for the IRA’s ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997; Conclusion; Appendix 1. IRA ’intended target’ killings by year in various geographical areas where the IRA operated, 1969 to 1994; Appendix 2. Seats won by Sinn Féin and the SDLP in district council elections between 1985 and 1997; Appendix 3. Other alleged agents and informers killed by the IRA.
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