Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit

制定收入机组的委托代理服务合同

政治经济学

原   价:
552.5
售   价:
442.00
优惠
平台大促 低至8折优惠
作      者
出版时间
2015年07月15日
装      帧
平装
ISBN
9783319186719
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语      种
英语
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库存 30 本
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图书简介
This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists’ principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal’s optimal offer together with the agent’s optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.
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