图书简介

Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman: Introduction; Part I: General Principles; 1 Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2 Gary E. Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3 Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory; Part II: Cases; Section II.A: Matching Markets; 4 Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5 Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice; 6 Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7 Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?; 8 Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas; 9 Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjostrom: Redesigning Microcredit; Section II.B: Auctions; 10 Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods; 11 Robert Day and Paul Milgrom: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12 Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton’s Ekati Diamonds; Section II.C: E-Commerce; 13 Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14 Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15 Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16 Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing; 17 Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith; Section II.D: Law Design; 18 Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19 Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; Part III: Experiments; 20 Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction; 21 Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22 Elena Katok: Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23 Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yaffe: The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; Part IV: Competing Designs; 24 Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms; 25 Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets

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