图书简介

1 Introduction; 1.1 Bibliographic Notes; I Anticipating Future Preferences; 2 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences I: Unconstrained Contracting; 2.1 The Multi-Selves Model; 2.1.1 Naivety; 2.2 Monopoly Pricing; 2.2.1 Optimal Price Schemes for Sophisticated Consumers; 2.2.2 Optimal Price Schemes for Naive Consumers; 2.2.3 Screening the Consumer’s Type; 2.3 Competitive Pricing; 2.4 Welfare Analysis; 2.5 Educating Naive Consumers; 2.6 The Interpretation of Naivety; 2.7 Two Applications; 2.8 Other Topics; 2.8.1 The (?, ?) Model; 2.8.2 Preference Heterogeneity; 2.9 Summary; 2.10 Bibliographic Notes; 3 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences II: Constrained Contracting; 3.1 Two-Part Tariffs; 3.1.1 Departure from Marginal-Cost Pricing; 3.1.2 Welfare Analysis; 3.2 Destabilization of Commitment Devices: Renegotiation and Spot Market; Competition; 3.3 Self-Control; 3.3.1 Implications for Monopoly Pricing; 3.3.2 Do Self-Control Costs Hamper Competition?; 3.4 Summary; 3.5 Bibliographic Notes; 4 Dynamically Inconsistent Preferences III: Partial Naivety; 4.1 Magnitude Naivety; 4.1.1 Monopoly Pricing; 4.1.2 Are More Sophisticated Consumers Always Better Off?; 4.2 Frequency Naivety; 4.2.1 First-Best Monopoly Pricing; 4.2.2 Second-Best Monopoly Pricing; 4.2.3 Does Competition Curb Exploitation?; 4.3 Summary; 4.4 Bibliographic Notes; 5 Biased Beliefs without Dynamic Inconsistency; 5.1 Monopoly Pricing with Over-Optimistic Consumers; 5.1.1 Comparison with Related Models; 5.2 Overconfidence: Three-Part Tariffs; 5.3 Unforeseen Contingencies: Add-On Pricing; 5.4 A Summary Exercise: Insurance Markets with Biased Consumers; 5.4.1 Equilibrium Analysis when Subjective Beliefs are Observable; 5.4.2 Equilibrium Analysis when Subjective Beliefs are Private Information; 5.5 Summary; 5.6 Bibliographic notes; A Appendix to Part I: A Decision-Theoretic Perspective; A.1 The Multi-Selves Model; A.2 Self-Control Preferences; A.3 The Relation between Self-Control Preferences and the Multi-Selves Model; A.4 Other Classes of Temptation-Driven Preferences; A.5 Bibliographic Notes; II Responding to Market Complexity; 6 Sampling-Based Reasoning: Price Competition and Product Differentiation; 6.1 A Sampling-Based Choice Procedure; 6.2 Price Competition and Technology Adoption; 6.2.1 Nash Equilibrium; 6.2.2 Welfare Analysis; 6.3 Spurious Product Differentiation; 6.3.1 Nash Equilibrium; 6.3.2 Product Complexity as a Differentiation Device; 6.4 Can the Market Educate Consumers?; 6.5 Summary; 6.6 Bibliographic Notes; 7 Sampling-Based Reasoning: Obfuscation; 7.1 A Model of Competitive Obfuscation; 7.1.1 Nash Equilibrium; 7.1.2 Welfare Analysis; 7.2 Production Inefficiencies; 7.3 Multi-Dimensional Prices; 7.4 A Market Intervention: Introducing \\Simple Options; 7.5 Summary; 7.6 Bibliographic Notes; 8 Coarse Reasoning; 8.1 A Modeling Framework; 8.2 Complex Price Patterns as a Discrimination Device; 8.2.1 DeBruijn Price Sequences; 8.2.2 Conditions for Profitability of Complex Price Patterns; 8.3 Limited Understanding of Adverse Selection; 8.3.1 A Buyer-Seller Example; 8.3.2 A Benchmark: A Bayesian-Rational Buyer; 8.3.3 A \\Coarse Buyer; 8.3.4 Action-Dependent Feedback; 8.4 Summary; 8.5 Bibliographic Notes; III Reference Dependence; 9 Loss Aversion; 9.1 Expected Price as a Reference Point: Monopoly Pricing; 9.1.1 Reduced Price Variability; 9.1.2 Impact on Expected Prices; 9.2 Price Uniformity in a Duopoly Setting: \\Kinked Demand; 9.3 Expected Consumption as a Reference Point: An \\Attachment Effect; 9.3.1 Personal Equilibrium; 9.3.2 Price Randomization; 9.4 Discussion; 9.4.1 Actual Prices as Reference Points; 9.4.2 Pleasant Surprises; 9.5 Summary; 9.6 Bibliographic Notes; 10 Inertia I: Price Competition; 10.1 Price Competition under Consumer Inertia; 10.2 Price-Frame Competition; 10.2.1 Nash Equilibrium; 10.2.2 Equilibrium Properties; 10.2.3 Two Market Interventions; 10.3 Consumer Switching; 10.4 Asymmetric Default Assignment; 10.5 A Few General Remarks; 10.5.1 More than Two Frames; 10.5.2 Revealed Preferences; 10.6 Summary; 10.7 Bibliographic Notes; 11 Inertia II: Costly Marketing 261; 11.1 A Model of Competitive Marketing; 11.2 Nash Equilibrium; 11.3 The Effective Marketing Property; 11.4 Discussion; 11.5 Summary; 11.6 Bibliographic Notes; IV Discussion; 12 Recurring Themes; 12.1 Complex Pricing Strategies; 12.2 Spurious Variety; 12.3 Market Transactions as a Form of Speculative Trade; 12.4 How Effective are Competition and Consumer Protection Policies?; 12.5 Externalities between Rational and Boundedly Rational Consumers; 12.6 Conclusion; 13 But Can’t we Get the Same Thing with a Standard Model?; 13.1 Rationalization via Modified Information; 13.2 Rationalization via Modified Preferences; 13.3 Rationalization via Endogenization; 13.4 Discussion; 13.5 Epilogue; 13.6 Bibliographic Notes; Bibliography; Index

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