Behavioral Game Theory:Experiments in Strategic Interaction(The Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics)

行为博弈论:战略互动实验(Google翻译)

政治经济学

原   价:
1095
售   价:
876.00
优惠
平台大促 低至8折优惠
发货周期:预计8-10周
作      者
出  版 社
出版时间
2003年03月17日
装      帧
精装
ISBN
9780691090399
复制
页      码
568
开      本
9.64 x 6.50 x 1.42
语      种
英文
综合评分
暂无评分
我 要 买
- +
库存 29 本
  • 图书详情
  • 目次
  • 买家须知
  • 书评(0)
  • 权威书评(0)
图书简介
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field’s leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
本书暂无推荐
本书暂无推荐
看了又看
  • 上一个
  • 下一个