Unelected Power:The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

未当选权:中央银行和监管国对合法性的追求

政治经济学

售   价:
169.00
发货周期:预计8-10周
出  版 社
出版时间
2019年09月10日
装      帧
平装
ISBN
9780691196305
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页      码
664
开      本
9.10 x 6.00 x 1.90
语      种
英文
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图书简介
How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracy Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
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