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Contents; vii; Preface ix; Introduction: The four musketeers xi; 1 A wealth of indicators 1; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 A bird’s eye view; 1.3 Aggregating the non-aggregatable?; 1.4 Correcting GDP; 1.5 Sustainability assessment: weak or strong?; 1.6 Coping with multidimensionality: dashboards; 1.7 An overhanging question: how far can aggregation go?; 2 Measuring sustainability; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Wealth and sustainable well-being; 2.2.1 Discounting future streams of well-being?; 2.2.2 From intertemporal well-being to sustainable consumption; 2.3 The savings approach: a reference framework; 2.3.1 Shifting the focus to sustainability : why?; 2.3.2 Assessing sustainability in imperfect but predictable economies.; 2.3.3 An example; 2.4 The savings approach: several pending problems; 2.4.1 Monetization in practice; 2.4.2 Behavioral indeterminacy or when ’weak’ indicators can; turn out too strong; 2.4.3 Technological and normative uncertainties; 2.4.4 An additional problem: the cross-national dimension of; unsustainability; 2.5 Conclusion: where to go from there?; iii; iv CONTENTS; 3 A price for everything?; 3.1 A revealed preference argument; 3.1.1 The argument for an individual consumer; 3.1.2 Extending the argument to social welfare through a representative agent; 3.1.3 Extending the argument to social welfare with an opti-; mality assumption; 3.2 A variant of the revealed preference argument; 3.3 The theory of index numbers; 3.3.1 An axiomatic approach; 3.3.2 Approximating welfare changes; 3.4 Decomposing welfare; 3.4.1 A first decomposition, with the social expenditure function; 3.4.2 A second decomposition, in terms of effeciency and equity; 3.4.3 A new decomposition, based on Bergson curves; 3.4.4 Another decomposition, for small variations; 3.5 Specific problems with imputed prices and full income; 3.6 Conclusion; 4 Equivalent income, or how to value what has no price; 4.1 Money-metric utility and equivalent income; 4.2 Knock-out criticism?; 4.2.1 Not welfarist enough; 4.2.2 Too welfarist; 4.2.3 Potentially regressive; 4.2.4 Reference dependent; 4.2.5 Arrow’s coup de grace; 4.3 Fairness to the rescue; 4.3.1 The equivalence approach in fair allocation theory; 4.3.2 Arrow Independence is not compelling; 4.3.3 References need not be arbitrary; 4.3.4 The right dose of welfarism; 4.3.5 Bundle dominance is unacceptable; 4.3.6 Egalitarianism is demanding; 4.4 Social welfare decomposition; 4.5 Conclusion; 5 Is happiness all that matters?; 5.1 The Easterlin paradox: Have we been wrong for 70,000 years?; 5.1.1 Bentham is back; 5.1.2 The debate about subjective welfarism; 5.1.3 Is happiness the ultimate goal?; 5.1.4 The key objection to subjective scores; 5.2 A theory of subjective well-being; 5.2.1 AOects and judgments; 5.2.2 The three problems of the respondent; CONTENTS v; 5.2.3 Heterogeneous and shifting standards; 5.2.4 What do people care about?; 5.2.5 Comparisons across preferences; 5.3 Making use of happiness data; 5.3.1 Proposed indicators; 5.3.2 Putting aOects in their place; 5.3.3 Identi?cation problems; 5.3.4 Can happiness data be improved?; 5.4 Conclusion; 6 Empowering capabilities; 6.1 The capability approach; 6.1.1 From basic needs to capabilities; 6.1.2 Functionings, between ’opulence’ and ’utility’; 6.1.3 From functionings to capabilities; 6.2 Capabilities as opportunities; 6.2.1 Valuing sets; 6.2.2 The relevant aspects of opportunities; 6.2.3 Shaping opportunity sets; 6.2.4 Equality against set valuation; 6.2.5 Why capabilities?; 6.3 The valuation issue; 6.3.1 The intersection approach; 6.3.2 Disagreement and respect for diversity; 6.3.3 Implications of respect for personal preferences; 6.4 Is the CA a separate approach?; Conclusion: How to converge on a multiplicity; Why synthetic indicators?; Shortcuts and pitfalls; Vices and virtues of monetary indicators; A multiplicity of synthetic indicators; Sustainability warnings; A A theory of the reference for equivalent incomes; A.1 The model; A.2 Reference operators; A.3 Non-market goods; A.4 Market prices; A.5 The household problem; B Proofs 233; B.1 A Paretian rank-dependent criterion; B.2 Reference-price independence; B.3 A simple proof of Arrow’s theorem in an economic framework; vi CONTENTS; Bibliography

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