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Limits, Continuity and Robustness: Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (D Fudenberg et al.); When are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? (D Fudenberg et al.); Reputation Effects: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent (M Celentani et al.); When is Reputation Bad? (J Ely et al.); Repeated Games: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (D Fudenberg & E Maskin); The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (D Fudenberg et al.); Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Perfect Public Equilibria When Players are Patient (D Fudenberg et al.); Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (D Fudenberg & D K Levine).

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