Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets

市场中的合作与效率

数量经济学

原   价:
553.00
售   价:
442.00
优惠
平台大促 低至8折优惠
作      者
出  版 社
出版时间
2011年05月15日
装      帧
平装
ISBN
9783642197628
复制
页      码
99
语      种
英语
综合评分
暂无评分
我 要 买
- +
库存 98 本
  • 图书详情
  • 目次
  • 买家须知
  • 书评(0)
  • 权威书评(0)
图书简介
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms’ average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.
本书暂无推荐
本书暂无推荐
看了又看
  • 上一个
  • 下一个