Relational Supply Contracts

关系供应契约:为持续质量改善在退货政策中的最优减让

商业经济学

原   价:
553.00
售   价:
442.00
优惠
平台大促 低至8折优惠
作      者
出  版 社
出版时间
2009年10月15日
装      帧
平装
ISBN
9783642027901
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页      码
140
语      种
英语
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库存 68 本
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图书简介
Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contract is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.
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