图书简介
More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security.
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Yale University Library
Princeton University Library
Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, 蓈a Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani; Part I. Computing in Games: 1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues 蓈a Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani; 2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou; 3. Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel; 4. Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour; 5. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns; 6. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin; 7. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani; 8. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan; Part II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design: 9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan; 10. Mechanism design without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra; 11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen; 12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi; 13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin; 14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker; 15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian; 16. On-line mechanisms David C. Parkes; Part III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria: 17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria Tim Roughgarden and 蓈a Tardos; 18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden; 19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games 蓈a Tardos and Tom Wexler; 20. Selfish load-balancing Berthold V鯿king; 21. Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms Ramesh Johari; Part IV. Additional Topics: 22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant; 23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff; 24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg; 25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment; 26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami; 27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami; 28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra; 29. Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory Michael Kearns and Siddharth Suri.
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