Justification without Awareness:A Defense of Epistemic Externalism:A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

没有意识的合理性:认知现象论的辩护

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685.00
发货周期:预计5-7周发货
作      者
出  版 社
出版时间
2006年05月18日
装      帧
精装
ISBN
9780199275748
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页      码
272
开      本
234x156mm
语      种
英文
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图书简介
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other ’good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children’s ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn’t required. Michael Bergmann’s book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
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Princeton University Library
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